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Introduction
By ‘technopolitics’, the author of this paper refers to Sloterdijk’s philosophical 
project to redesign a polis around a redefinition of the meaning and the importance of 
technology1. The aim of this paper is to describe and critically analyse how this new social 
structure has its foundations in a redefinition of the environment as an evil place – rather 
than a neutral one, which mankind must redesign via technology. The environment is 
considered as a danger that human beings need to fight against in order to remodel nature 
and establish a new kind of artificial one. Referring to the metaphor of the biblical Ark, 
as we will see later on, Sloterdijk shows how nature represents the universal flood, the 
wet evil, against which the Ark – a technological tool – saves mankind as well all the other 
species. Therefore, there is no space left for a rehabilitation of the natural dimension: 
‘man’s right to inhabit the original date of what is natural is lost for all time and must be 
placed on a good new, formal footing’2 (Sloterdijk 2014, 241). Humans need to design 
1 Article proofread by Stephen Dersley (ORCID:0000-0002-6765-8590)
2  All quotes from this book are translated by the author.
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Abstract: This paper will analyse the role played by technology in Peter Sloterdijk’s 
theory, where he seeks to redefine and reconstruct ethics, society and democracy. 
Indeed, the philosopher’s project is to build a new kind of society, which risks 
being antidemocratic and elitist: technopolitics. This lemma refers to Sloterdijk’s 
reconfiguration of the social structure through the elimination of the human rights 
paradigm in a technological and anti-egalitarian manner. In order to do this, Sloterdijk 
redesigns the environment as a dangerous place whose rules cannot be followed, and 
which must be reshaped through technology. Hence, the philosopher reduces ethics to 
technology, and reinterprets society on the basis of new techno-ethical premises which 
support a hierarchical and selective new polis.




a new environment in which they can survive safely, and the only way to do so is via 
technology.
Now, this new understanding of the concept of nature leads to the formulation of an 
antidemocratic and discriminatory polis, based on the distinction between selectors and 
selected. While the formers are elevated and saved by technology, the latter are expelled 
because of technology. This new social structure coincides with a techno-polis.
Therefore, this paper seeks to analyse and evaluate Sloterdijk’s theoretical proposal 
and ultimately assess whether his philosophical speculation is coherent and based on 
solid assumptions, or not. The crucial role Sloterdijk assigns to technology will be the 
fil rouge through which the author will be following the various twists and changes the 
philosopher makes to his approach in order to try to ensure his speculation remains 
integral. The final aim is to show how Sloterdijk’s theorization presents too many 
ambiguities which ultimately lead to the collapse of his entire project.
1. Technology as a Denial of the Environment
In his work, Sloterdijk uses technology to refer to a safe haven, as opposed to a 
natural and evil environment that has to be modified and redefined by humans. Indeed, 
Sloterdijk refuses the idea of nature as the protective good mother of every human being. 
According to him, human beings can no longer find safety and protection in nature, but 
rather they do so in their own actions and the related by-products. Therefore, technology 
appears to be the key to human salvation against this dangerous environment. In order to 
explain what this new understanding of technology truly implies, Sloterdijk refers to the 
image of the Ark. The Ark is presented as „a mechanical uterus in which life is possible and 
is developed as opposed to a non-maternal environment (…) indeed, after the universal 
flood, nature can no longer claim unreservedly to be an entirely good mother”. Sloterdijk 
uses this reference to the biblical event in order to underline how nature can no longer be 
considered a protection for humans: „mankind will in future be condemned to provide for 
itself with the help of God. This marks the beginning of history as a technological era; the 
true human era must be calculated not from creation, but rather ‘from the receding of the 
waters’” (Sloterdijk  2014, 239–40).
The philosopher uses the Ark because he believes it represents a revolutionary 
symbol which establishes a new starting point in human history. The Ark refers to an 
internal, artificial and closed world: the only possible environment for humans. It is defined 
as „the autonomous, absolute house, free from contexts, without neighbours; it embodies 
in an exemplary way the denial of the environment through an artificial structure”. This is 
the first and primary realization of the autogenous container, a completely new project: 
„the idea of a group’s self-protection and self-circumvention (Selbstumgebung) against an 
external world that has become impossible” (Sloterdijk 2014, 237).
Now, it is clear how Sloterdijk wants to overturn the role once played by nature 
Peter Sloterdijk’s Technopolitics
40
with technology in order to redefine it as the fundamental point of reference for humans. 
Hence, he uses the Ark to underline how humans, thanks to technology, are able to survive 
and to adapt to their surrounding environment; he therefore fully substitutes nature with 
technology.
Notwithstanding, this overturning is not without consequences: indeed, „in every 
fantasy of the Ark, the selection of the few is affirmed as a sacred necessity; many are 
invited, but few get on board”.
This is a necessary selection between those who succeed and those who do not: 
Sloterdijk theorizes a theology of survival, a theology of selection, to justify his elitist project 
at a higher level: „For those who have the moral and logical necessity to imagine ways 
of salvation in a universalistic way, a hard to bear restriction appears here” (Sloterdijk 
2014, 246–47).
In his misunderstanding of the biblical passage, he uses this episode of the Ark to 
show how only the best can save themselves, thanks to technology and God’s blessing –
even though it seems that there is no more need for God himself.
Now, using the Ark as a way to introduce technology as the new paradigm of society, 
Sloterdijk postulates a new environment justified by the fact that the previous paradigm, 
nature, is no longer a possibility for human beings. According to these premises, 
universalism is no longer a value, since humans have to defend themselves from an evil 
nature and thus need to build barriers for protection. The Ark, indeed, represents the first 
barrier and, because of its own specific nature, it needs to be elitist.
Taking these considerations as a starting point, it is important to note, from a 
philosophical perspective, the connection created by Sloterdijk in order to support 
his antidemocratic project, i.e., the techno-polis. Indeed, the assumption of an original 
dangerous environment for human beings, linked to the idea that technology has to 
re-create the world in order to make it safe, unavoidably presents the premises for a 
society based on discrimination. Indeed, as the imagine of the Ark shows, this idea of 
technology as the only way to salvation designs a technologically advanced polis that is 
anti-egalitarian and totally indifferent to human rights. Now, the crux of the matter is in 
this specific approach taken by Sloterdijk: his anti-egalitarian position – often ascribed to 
him because of his project to eliminate the fatalism of birth, i.e., the control of the natural 
human origin via genetic manipulation – actually derives from this controversial and 
problematic interpretation of the environment.
Within this framework, in his Sphere trilogy (Sloterdijk 2011, 2014, 2016)3 
3  The notion of the sphere is a key pillar of Peter Sloterdijk’s theorization: he believes being-
in-the-sphere is the constitutive condition of being human. In fact, contrary to Heidegger, who 
based his theory on time, Sloterdijk focuses his analysis on space, considering space as the real 
openness from which human beings emerged. The concept of the sphere refers to an original 
shared and closed spatiality where men live as humans and which constitutes the only way for 
human existence. The sphere refers to an intermediate condition, between the external unknown 
and dangerous environment and the internal environment, which is closed, safe and protected. 
This is the human world, where human beings grow and evolve. Using the sphere as his main 
reference, the author believes he is placing the human being in a strategic condition, because he 
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Sloterdijk defines the history of the world as a uterotechnics, i.e., the history of the 
attempts to remodel society by recreating the natural uterine condition on social and 
external grounds. Society, now conceivable as the opposite of nature, is the new artificial 
environment, the uterotechnics, which saves humans. As the womb protects the child 
during intrauterine life, society – the Ark – can protect individuals once they come to 
the world and begin living outside their first container. This is the reason why Sloterdijk 
refers to the evocative image of the womb, translating it into the technological world with 
the concept of the Ark, intended as a mechanical uterus, which brings salvation from the 
wet evil, the environment as such.
Once Sloterdijk has technologically reconfigured the classical conflict between 
nature and culture, he can use these theoretical premises to state the primacy of technology. 
This is a crucial passage for the realization of his final project, technopolitics. Indeed, the 
establishment of a technopolitical system needs to go through this understanding of the 
environment as a dangerous place whose rules cannot be followed, but which rather must 
be remodelled and reconfigured. Therefore, Sloterdijk needs to postulate the primacy 
of technology as the first and most important value. In order to do so, he overturns the 
relationship between ethics and technology, making technology the new ethical point of 
reference. This way he can exclusively argue that everything which can be done has to 
be done, in order to establish a new kind of pyramidal society which is technologically 
oriented. Technology becomes, in Sloterdijk’s theoretical approach, the key to solving all 
the issues he has highlighted so far.
In order to explain how technology is the destination point of his line of thought, 
Sloterdijk elaborates „a virtual incubator of zoopolitical protection at the hands of the 
very State” (Tillería Aqueveque 2020 75), where protection and care for human beings 
become the formula to indicate control and selection.
Indeed, if Sloterdijk’s technological conception of society derives from his 
understanding of the environment as a dangerous place, it is crucial to deepen its 
redefinition and realization, on a social level, as a human park.
2. The Power to Select and Control the Human Zoo
Sloterdijk affirms the importance of human domestication and human breeding as 
a way of contributing to the well-being and the enhancement of society.  With this idea 
as a starting point, the philosopher’s project becomes explicit: he establishes the terms 
and grounds on which individuals can be part of society. Once again, Sloterdijk adopts a 
is guaranteeing them the necessary protection to evolve and survive by acting on the external 
environment not subject to its interferences. Sloterdijk uses this concept to reread the whole 
history of humanity through the category of the sphere. Indeed, he theorizes the existence of 
microspheres as well as macrospheres, until finally elaborating the notion of ‘foams’ to indicate 
the disintegration of the sphere itself. For further information on the development of the sphere, 
please refer to the Sphere trilogy. For the first Italian monograph on Sloterdijk and his spherology, 
please refer to Lucci (2011).
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clear elitist perspective, and therefore does not support a democratic vision of society, 
nor a human rights logic – „Sloterdijk neither is nor wants to be a theorist of equality” 
(Couture 2016 2). He believes human beings have to earn their place in society and that 
not everyone can participate in it or occupy positions of power.
Hence Sloterdijk speaks about human breeding and domestication as the first 
steps towards the creation of a human zoo, i.e., the establishment of a society, that new 
artificial environment where human beings are controlled and selected in order to 
establish an enhanced society. Furthermore, he believes the best way to select them is 
through anthropotechnics. In this context, he analyses two types of anthropotechnics, i.e., 
the use of technological criteria for deciding on one’s inclusion or exclusion in society: 
a primary type which includes education, taming, disciplining and formation, and a 
secondary type which consists of specific „direct interventions into the genetic ‘text’ of 
individuals” (Sloterdijk 2017a, 127). Indeed, in this secondary type, the redefinition of 
the environment becomes the justification for redesigning the same genetic constitution 
of human beings, coinciding with it. For the purposes of this paper, the author will 
primarily take into consideration the second type of anthropotechnics. In his very famous 
essay Rules for the Human Park (Sloterdijk 2017b), which caused the Sloterdijk affair4, 
the philosopher criticises the first type of anthropotechnics, which he identifies with 
humanism: he believes it is a way to control and tame human beings through education 
and cultural selection5.
Sloterdijk is not interested in demolishing the idea of breeding humans – quite the 
opposite – but he criticises the humane way of doing so. Indeed, he believes “humans 
voluntarily and deliberately put themselves in ‘theme parks’, ‘human zoos’’’ because if 
“being-in-the-world means making worlds”, as Eduardo Mendieta explains, “hominization 
(…) is also a history of the world we have made to cultivate, to breed, to domesticate, to 
preserve ourselves” (Mendieta 2012, 72).
4  The Sloterdijk affair refers to a very intense debate that took place between Habermas and 
Sloterdijk after Sloterdijk gave a talk at Castle Elmau in 1999, where he presented his “Rules for 
the Human Zoo”. In this talk he linked his interpretation of humanism to a return to eugenics, in 
the form of biotechnology; his provocative and very ambiguous arguments paved the way for a 
variety of interpretations, and Sloterdijk was accused of being a Nazi sympathizer. The scandal was 
reported on by German newspapers “Die Zeit” and “Der Spiegel”, by Thomas Assheuer and Reinhard 
Mohr, who accused Sloterdijk of proposing a genetic revision of humanity through selection and 
breeding and of advocating again via prenatal selection the eugenic Nazi ideal, respectively. The 
author defended himself accusing – besides Assheuer – Habermas, as he was the hidden instigator, 
claiming that the one who presented himself as the philosopher of the other’s inclusion, did not 
give the chance to have a proper discussion on the topic. This opened a very harsh dispute between 
the two philosophers that ended with a demonstration of Habermas’ guilt and the declaration of 
the death of critical theory. To see an in-depth analysis of the dispute, please refers to Couture 
(2016, 74–84). For an Italian reference on the topic, please refer to Calligaris (2011).
5  According to Sloterdijk’s interpretation, since humanism has failed its project to present itself 
as ‘a school of human formation’ (Sloterdijk 2017b, 204), it is necessary to rethink a way to 
domesticate humans and subsequently to implement this approach and rebuild society on this 
new perspective. The philosopher’s intent is to show how humanism was also a form of control, 
albeit a covert one; following and embracing Nietzsche’s speculations, Sloterdijk highlights 




Just as humanism had established a hierarchy among people based on their active 
or passive role in the breeding dynamics, controlled by an élite who decided the criteria 
of selection and exclusion, Sloterdijk aims to create a distinction between humans. More 
specifically, he seeks to differentiate between smaller human beings who have been bred 
as domestic animals, and superhumans, who control others through “an artful linking of 
ethics and genetics” (Sloterdijk 2017b, 208). As Jean-Pierre Couture outlines, “Sloterdijk 
adopts Nietzsche’s perspective by opposing the horizontal trends of democratic equality 
to the vertical trends of heroic surpassing”(Couture 2016, 37). In fact, Sloterdijk’s elitist 
perspective contemplates genetic selection to improve and enhance humankind, and 
to arrange individuals into a social pyramid built on the differences among individual 
qualities and humans’ subsequent abilities to improve and enhance themselves. This way, 
society establishes the criteria upon which to decide who deserves to become an active 
member in it and who, in contrast, can form its passive substrate or has to be totally 
excluded.
Thanks to the secondary type of anthropotechnics, which nowadays corresponds 
to the available reproductive technologies – and their successive future development6, 
society validates Sloterdijk’s political project of controlling and selecting humans through 
technology.
Sloterdijk draws inspiration for his ideas from Plato’s Politikos, the dialogue where 
the Greek author discusses the best way to govern the polis and compares it to a zoological 
garden, a theme park. Here we can underline that the idea of a redesigned environment 
which determines the same human anthropology comes back repeatedly. Sloterdijk uses 
the Platonic zoo as a reference point for designing his society and showing how political 
concern is actually a reflection on the governance of the human zoo, precisely because 
the management of humans is a zoopolitical task. It is a type of political anthropotechnics 
which establishes the real political figure, i.e., someone whose power derives from “the 
royal knowledge of breeding” (Sloterdijk 2017b, 214).
Sloterdijk adapts the idea of the human zoo to his time – the technological era, 
reflecting on how to structure it in the best possible way:
It is the signature of the technological and anthropotechnological era that human 
beings become increasingly involved in the active or subjective side of selection, 
without having to be voluntarily thrust into the role of the selector. Additionally, 
one may observe that there is an unease in the power of choice; soon it will 
6  The main possible development of the actual reproductive technologies is ectogenesis. This 
notion means the option to transfer partially and/or totally the generative process in an artificial 
womb: this would lead to control the foetus from the very moment of fecundation until birth, 
after having produced artificial embryos in laboratories. Nowadays ectogenesis is not a concrete 
possibility and it is theorized to save premature foetuses, but the first successful experiments have 
taken place. Doctor A. Flake and his team, at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, transferred 
some lamb foetuses in artificial bags which recreated the uterus conditions and they monitored 
them until the moment of birth. The limit for the transfer they pointed out is week 23 because 
the internal organs are not formed before then. Indeed, scientists do not yet know the formation 
process in details and the previous experiments with a goat’s foetus failed. The experiment was 




become an instance of opting for innocence when human beings explicitly refuse 
to exercise the power of selection that they have in fact managed to achieve. 
But as soon as powers of knowledge are positively developed in a field, human 
beings cut a poor figure if they—as in earlier times of incapacity—wish to allow 
a higher force, whether it be God or chance or something else, to act in their stead 
(Sloterdijk 2017b, 211).
This is how Sloterdijk clarifies his intent to rebuild society based on this self-
selective process: even though the selective mechanism is already present in it, if men 
discover a better way to implement it, they have a duty to use it in order to move to the 
active side of selection. This becomes the watershed according to which to exclude or 
include individuals in society: if, as Sloterdijk proposes, individuals have to deserve their 
place in society and have to position themselves on the social hierarchy, this becomes 
a way to create competition among them, to see who succeeds in becoming an active 
selector, avoiding ‘any higher force to act in his stead’.
Thus, a clear distinction emerges between selectors – the ones who are saved and 
selected, and those ones who are excluded. Just as in the Ark metaphor, in the context of 
the transformation of the human environment into the form of the human park there is 
the same anti-egalitarian and anti-universalistic logic. And this represents the crucial and 
problematic outcome of Sloterdijk’s entire redefinition of technology.
3. The Imperative of Technology
The need to transform both the human environment and the natural one through 
technology derives from the primacy of technology itself, i.e., the idea that technology 
is the only valuable criterion upon which to reconfigure society. Indeed, Sloterdijk 
seeks to turn the subject’s ability to do something (I can, Ich kann in German) into a 
duty (I may, therefore I have to, Ich darf [I may] in German). In Sloterdijk’s opinion, “the 
affective kernels of modern forward progress are the I-can [Ich-kann] and it’s-a-go [Es-
geht]” (Sloterdijk 2017c, 230). This implies that if something becomes possible, thanks 
to progress and technology, we must give it a chance, “give it a go”, without considering 
beforehand whether it is right to do it or not. Furthermore, recalling the idea that the 
natural environment must change for it to be liveable for humans, every chance to 
transform it – including the modification of its inhabitants – is welcome and supported.
This way, since technology paves the way for new possibilities and, as outlined 
above, these possibilities therefore have to be realized, ethics becomes subordinated to 
technology just because of technological progress, which cannot be stopped in order for 
it to be evaluated.
Nevertheless, ethics cannot accept abdication in favour of a free and limitless 
technology: ethics remains the point of reference for making an evaluation, since ethical 
concerns comprehend every human action.
Notwithstanding, Sloterdijk does not take into consideration this implication 
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and he does not question the idea of the park itself: his only concern is to find a code 
of anthropotechnics to manage the new power of self-breeding in a responsible way, 
thanks to the new anthropotechnical possibilities. Sloterdijk refers to a technical code, 
not an ethical one – as Tugendhat (1999, as cited in Musio 2005) highlights – because he 
considers the traditional ethical issues to be as dead as humanism. On the contrary, as the 
author of this paper has already shown, he tries to establish a new ethical system based 
on technologies, where ethics is subordinate to technology and where technological 
opportunities become the only way to concretize the pyramidal enhancement paradigm.
This pyramidal program elaborated on the concept of enhancement is based on 
an acritical imperative of efficiency: everyone has to be more efficient and there is no 
way of avoiding it. Indeed, as Giovanni Leghissa (2012) outlines, if an individual tries not 
to optimize himself, he is threatened with exclusion from the social dynamic, which has 
become a fight for the same subject’s survival, based on the efficiency paradigm. Indeed, 
as outlined above, if technology becomes the only value to refer to, when there is the 
chance of enhancement there is a duty to achieve it, just because it is possible.
Nevertheless, Sloterdijk himself highlights how critical this paradigm is: human 
beings can reach their dignity and their value only if they prove to be successful in life. 
They must overcome their deficiencies in spite of any kind of original differences and 
conditions. This new form of perfection, based on performance, becomes the new ethical 
paradigm upon which human beings can be judged.  As Sloterdijk observes, this ethical-
anthropological ‘in spite of’ makes disability the baseline condition for every global 
consumer, who must be appraised on the preference market in spite of all his limitations. 
However, in his Il capitale in-umano, Alessio Musio (2016b) points out how Sloterdijk’s 
considerations – and it is not clear whether Sloterdijk truly believes them or whether 
these are only musings – cannot be accepted, since they completely overturn the logic of 
human rights. Following this logic, people have value and dignity by virtue of being human 
beings, despite the possible differences amongst each other. In contrast, in Sloterdijk’s 
considerations, this ‘despite’ becomes the starting point from which human beings can 
exceed their limitations and can acquire their dignity. Without this effort, they cannot 
survive under the imperative of efficiency. Indeed, this ‘despite’, which rereads the whole 
of human anthropology, constitutes the ethical duty humankind has in order to reshape 
the environment on a technological basis and, therefore, the polis as well.
However, as Musio (2016b, 312) underlines, if our value is based exclusively on the 
outcome of our efforts, the ethical-philosophical origin of human rights is lost. Sloterdijk 
says that „it is no longer enough to be a human as one was supposedly spawned by nature; 
the dream of simple self-foundation via the origin is over” (Sloterdijk 2013, 328).
Therefore, with this refined move, Sloterdijk, again, makes a complete overhaul 
of the ethical paradigm, designating autonomy and self-selection as the highest values 
to reach, and anthropotechnics as the means to do so. Technology thus becomes a 
constitutive and definitive part of the human being, as well as of the environment, and 
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this is why it becomes unfair and unjust to ignore it: concretely, this means that human 
beings have the duty to actualize their possibilities in order to be in charge of themselves. 
Therefore, if humans have the chance to select themselves also genetically, they must do 
so. As Sloterdijk famously says:
Whether long-term development will also lead to a genetic reform of attributes 
of the species—whether a future anthropotechnology will advance to an explicit 
planning of traits; whether humanity will be able to carry out, on the level of 
the species as a whole, a switch from the fatalism of births to optional birth and 
prenatal selection — these are questions with which the evolutionary horizon 
begins to clear before us, however indistinctly and frighteningly (Sloterdijk 
2017b, 211).
Therefore, the last pieces of the broader picture that is Sloterdijk’s project to establish 
a controlling society are manipulation and genetic planning. This way society becomes so 
powerful that it can reformulate even the notion of the human being, rebuilding it by 
basing it on the category of autonomy through the elimination of his natural contingency7. 
This is what Sloterdijk calls the fatalism of birth. Through technological support, society 
controls every step of human generation and decides who may or may not be born – this 
is what optional birth and prenatal selection really mean – not leaving to anybody else, 
‘whether it be God or chance or something else’, the possibility to choose instead. Only Big 
Mother8 can have the power to shape its product – the human being.
Indeed, just as the environment no longer represents a mother-nature, but rather 
an evil stepmother, the act of human birth itself becomes a dangerous and uncontrollable 
event in human life, which has to be monitored and dominated technologically.
However, Sloterdijk does not seem to realize the consequences of his theories, and 
he puts forward these futuristic possibilities without considering their most problematic 
aspects. In reality, he shies away from bringing his assumptions together in a concise 
theoretical overview because it would force him to realize that the house supporting his 
thought is made of cards, rather than solid foundations.
With all these technological revolutions – or involutions – Sloterdijk allows society 
to choose among individuals at a very early stage, and to decide how to domesticate and 
breed them. This controlling formula leads to the creation of automatons, raised by the 
rules of society. In order to create a hierarchy among people, not only on the basis of 
genetic manipulation, but rather during their entire life, Sloterdijk elaborates the theory 
of ascetism. Indeed, ascetism represents the last step of the anti-universalistic perspective 
of the philosopher, expressed by the idea of a repetition circuit from which it is very 
difficult to get free. Those who succeed in this process become the active and powerful 
7  For an in-depth analysis of the topic, please refer to Musio (2012). The author faces the 
problematic significance of the elimination of this lemma, both for the definition of the human 
being and for its bioethical implications.
8  With ‘Big Mother,’ the author of this paper recalls Orwell’s (1949) dystopic image of a totalitarian 
powerful society which controls every aspect of its citizens’ lives. The reference highlights how 




4. Autonomy: The Dark Side of Asceticism
Sloterdijk adds another element to his reconfiguration of the natural environment: 
he believes every human activity can be included in a repetition cycle that represents 
the way human beings learn how to produce themselves (Sloterdijk 2013). Indeed, the 
philosopher considers that human beings can only achieve their maximization through 
anthropotechnical repetition; this means that the individual is a subject who self-produces 
through the reiteration of a series of activities9. He includes in these activities all voluntary 
or involuntary disciplines with a technical substrate which define and determine human 
behaviours. Everything forms part of this repetition cycle, from religion to ethics to sport. 
Sloterdijk affirms that men produce men „through a life in form of practice” (Sloterdijk 
2013, 4). Once again, he severs every bond with the natural origin of humankind – i.e., 
the coming to the world – and its environment, therefore considering humankind as a 
technological self-production. Indeed, the only important thing is to distinguish between 
good and bad repetitions. Good repetitions are conscious practices that bring the 
individual to elevate himself in an attempt to constantly outdo himself. This leads the 
individual to improve his life condition until he manages to overcome the repetition circle 
and reach the ascetic form10, which coincides with his realization not as an automaton, 
but rather as a conscious subjectivity – indeed he calls this outcome de-automatization.
Although the idea to try to better oneself is good in itself, Sloterdijk uses it to 
classify and arrange human beings within his elitist project. In fact, individuals can affirm 
themselves only through their capacity to reiterate themselves, and not everyone has the 
same opportunities to do so. Furthermore, human beings can reach their subjectivity 
through a process that defines them – some of them11 – as the good products of repetition. 
Human beings are designed through the productive categories and are considered to 
be just like objects: they are completely controlled by the anthropotechnics that define 
them. In fact, even though there is a chance to abandon the repetition cycle, human beings 
improve themselves and form themselves within it; they are its product and not its master. 
After all, Sloterdijk designs the repetition cycle in a way that cannot be and must not be 
9  As Graziella Berto (2012, 96) shows, what distinguishes Sloterdijk’s idea of exercise from other 
types of practices is that there is a permanent condition of training, without a real conclusion. 
Individuals never acquire a stable form; it is always faltering, and it needs constant practice in 
order to be preserved. The danger of letting themselves be carried away by the flow is always 
present, therefore men must keep exercising.
10  Pier Aldo Rovatti (2012, 12) explains how having good discipline in continuing to exercise is 
not enough to reach the ascetic form, since repetition does not automatically contain the subjective 
disposition to improve oneself. Indeed, asceticism corresponds to a superior reality, to another life 
which is originally presented in anticipation to the individual and represents the final aim of the 
good practices.
11  It is not clear what happens to the ones who fail in the ascetic process: they stay in a fuzzy and 
intermediate dimension of indeterminacy.
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destroyed, as it represents the final outcome of his elitist technological revision of the 
environment.
Now, at first Sloterdijk’s proposal may appear democratic, since he believes 
everyone starts from the same level. Humans are tempered by habits and customs, learnt 
through repetition, and they are not aware of this because they have grown accustomed to 
this cycle; then, some of them become conscious of this situation and release themselves 
through good practices, while others remain in their initial condition. At a second glance, 
however it becomes clear that this is a critical point, because it discriminates those who 
succeed from those who fail. In fact, this distinction leads inevitably to the idea that a 
part of the population cannot reach freedom from these conditionings and spend their 
entire lifetime in a state of no-subjectivity, i.e., in Sloterdijk’s perspective, a permanent 
unconsciousness12.
The aim of the ascetic process should be to be free from any automatism and 
conditioning and to reach critical judgment through good repetitions. However, although 
the philosopher postulates ethical life as the achievement of de-automatization, he does 
not consider how he has already demolished any ethical content, levelling it just like 
every anthropotechnical practice13. He has not left any possibility to establish an ethical 
criterion, since ethics is subordinated to technology and it is not independent.
After all, the entire repetition system is based on the idea that men produce men 
through practice: if Sloterdijk provided a realistic solution to this vicious cycle, he 
would supply the key to deconstructing the new anthropotechnical environment he has 
established.
This is yet another shift made by Sloterdijk without considering the consequences: 
it is a contradiction to place ethics at the end of the repetition cycle if it is impossible to 
define the specificity of ethics itself, and if ethics represents a practice within the cycle 
and not outside of it. It seems there is no way to leave the repetition circuit, because 
the ascetic process is unable to break its mechanism, since it is compromised from the 
beginning.
Furthermore, Sloterdijk definitively disempowers ethical content when he claims 
that the content of the practice is irrelevant, and that the only aspect to consider is the 
capacity to be active and to become increasingly autonomous. Indeed, as Alessio Musio 
12  According to Sloterdijk’s philosophical speculation, subjectivity coincides exclusively with 
consciousness. He rejects the idea of a constitutive subjectivity, excluding any form of ontological 
link. It becomes a quality someone can achieve – or not – through the ascetic process. Only if and 
once the subject concludes positively this process, can he recognize and define himself as conscious 
and ultimately autonomous.
13  Sloterdijk does not consider this point as relevant, wanting to avoid any link to God or 
metaphysics in order to establish the ethical content of life. Indeed, as Edoardo Greblo (2012, 
108) outlines, ethics becomes a kind of intentional and wanted self-proxy, i.e., a dedication to a 
personal conversion to a better life. The single individual can decide, autonomously, what is good 
and what is bad, to evaluate his life as a success or a failure. However, this interpretation of ethics 
does not work even for Sloterdijk, since he theorizes a relevant difference between good and bad 
practices which is fundamental for reaching asceticism. Therefore, this is another critical point in 
his speculation, which remains open and unsolved.
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(2016a, 81) highlights, Sloterdijk argues that the way one can learn ethical content is the 
same way one can learn a language in Wittgenstein’s theory. It is all about practice and 
repetition: without reflection.
However, life can be defined as a moral life when reflection, in the form of critical 
judgment, intervenes, deciding what, here and now, is objectively good to do (Musio 2016a, 
82). Thus, habits and repetitions become virtues exclusively under these circumstances, 
i.e., when they are the result of a critical evaluation which has determined what deserves 
to be really exercised (because it is good) and what does not. Without this distinction 
between what is good and what is bad, there is no possibility to talk about ethics at all.
This is the crucial point in Sloterdijk’s philosophical speculation, because he believes 
the only important thing is to achieve autonomy and the best way to become active and 
autonomous is ‘to exercise the power of selection that they have in fact managed to 
achieve’, i.e., to select and control human generation, eliminating the original passivity – 
the fatalism of births14 – that characterizes human beings.
Sloterdijk’s final aim is ultimately made explicit: the few who become subjects 
within society assume the power to control and select the others, since they have shown 
to be better than anyone else. Moreover, they have the duty to use their technologies to 
enhance society, and if this means to genetically control all the others, then they must do 
so. Asceticism becomes the selective criterion for inclusion and exclusion in the sphere 
of society, a discriminating way to arrange people into a hierarchy, on the basis of their 
capacity to escape the repetition cycle or not.
This is how Sloterdijk concludes his technopolitics project, by elaborating an 
artificial nature through which human beings can be controlled and selected. He has 
created a new technological environment in which his political goal – the antidemocratic 
society called technopolitics – finds its realization. Clearly, this is the culminating point of 
the excluding and discriminating project that is the human zoo.
However, Sloterdijk does not consider how powerful the natural environment is. 
He stretches it to the extreme consequences, trying to reshape it as if it were modelling 
clay at the disposal of humans; notwithstanding, the environment does not follow the 
anthropotechnical repetitions Sloterdijk elaborates for it. Nature itself works by its own 
repetitions, i.e., the succession of the seasons, the alternance between day and night, the 
tides, photosynthesis, and so on. These autonomous natural repetitions are so powerful 
14  Sloterdijk plays with a specific definition of nature, intended as a chance that must be improved 
by technology in order to give it some rationality. As Sjoerd van Tuinen (2011) highlights, 
supporting Sloterdijk’s perspective, there is a need for this intervention. “At work here is a 
technology mediated, intergenerational, or natal difference, which, by differentiating nature into 
a process with two sides – one of production, natura naturans, and one of its products, natura 
naturata – frees the creative force of life from its fixation on the side of the produced. Firstly, 
this difference forces us to understand technology as a production process in which there is no 
absolute difference between nature and ‘human’ technology. Secondly, it disallows us to reduce 
the essence of life to the prescriptive laws of what exists or to disconnect it from the laws of self-
transgressing becoming. Thirdly, it makes us realise that life, no matter whether it is defined 
biologically, ecologically, or morally, cannot be restricted to the domain of an essentialistically 
defined humanity” (Tuinen 2011, 54).
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that not even a system like technopolitics is able to stop them. There is no way to redefine 
an environment which is already independent, and which forms the origin of humans: we 
can try to domesticate it and separate ourselves from it, but this attempt is doomed to 
failure; it is impossible to eradicate a thing’s own nature.
Conclusions
Based on the considerations made thus far, it is now crucial to examine the 
conclusions Sloterdijk reached in order to evaluate the consistency of his theoretical 
proposal.
Sloterdijk’s final aim was to establish a new social structure which is antidemocratic 
and elitist: technopolitics. This is the fundamental purpose which needs to be taken into 
consideration as the basis for every successive philosophical speculation and theory. 
However, this is an impossible purpose to realize, since Sloterdijk’s speculation runs 
aground in its own short circuits. Indeed, as the present author has shown, Sloterdijk 
tries to completely redesign nature through technology, arguing for a separation between 
a human artificial environment, enclosed and safe, and an evil external nature.
Indeed, he relies on technology and its powers to defeat the natural course of life in 
order to design a new artificial nature, with all the implications this paradoxical concept 
presents within itself. However, this is just an attempt to modify in every possible way the 
same meaning of nature and of the subjects within it.
Thus, Sloterdijk builds his speculation on the notion of technology, considering 
it as the only reference value. Indeed, once Sloterdijk has made ethics collapse under 
technology, he can play this card every time he faces a contradiction, or he finds himself 
at a dead end. This way, he eliminates every obstacle to the establishment of this new 
technological environment.
Sloterdijk’s thought is magmatic, a labyrinth in which it is easy to get lost. 
Nevertheless, if we analyse its premises, we can trace his line of thought back to its origins. 
His theories are based on three key concepts: the idea of an initial, dangerous natural 
environment we have to get rid of; the idea of humans as beings in progress; and the idea 
of technology as a solution to the previous issues.
Once these premises are put in place, Sloterdijk can reconfigure the original nature, 
the wet evil, into a redeeming technological product which makes it possible to live safely. 
This is the most crucial passage in the analysis presented in this paper: Sloterdijk’s 
fundamental move consists in this redefinition of technology as the new creation of the 
environment and of humankind. Starting from this prerequisite, he then argues in favour 
of a reinterpretation of society, democracy and ethics through the forms of the human 
zoo, the ‘despite’ and the repetition cycle. In a word, technopolitics.
Now, a key issue tied up with Sloterdijk’s philosophical speculation is his willingness 
to remain ambiguous. This leads him to simultaneously support overwhelmingly different 
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positions which can easily become contradictions. As we have shown, technology 
represents the new artificial environment in which he founds his social project of the zoo. 
In order to establish this new system of controlling and selecting people hierarchically, 
Sloterdijk theorizes the fall of human rights logic and the impossible ascetic process. 
These are his instruments to keep his structure solid.
However, Sloterdijk’s project is a failure because the basis on which he tries to build 
his zoo is not solid: there is no chance of a dominating and discriminating society without 
subjects. In fact, every society needs the possibility to establish human relationships, even 
powerful or controlling ones. Arguing against the formation of subjectivity, Sloterdijk 
prevents the constitution of the social pyramid: there cannot be societies amongst objects, 
as subjects are needed in order to establish any kind of human relationship. Who is going 
to govern the zoo if there are no real subjects at all?
Now, it is true that many different kinds of relationships15 can be established, and 
not only among people16. However, social and power relationships imply, at least at their 
origin, the presence of human beings. Therefore, referring to the project of Sloterdijk’s 
human zoo, we can highlight a fundamental lack of this human element in the configuration 
of the social structure. This is a crucial point in the philosopher’s theoretical itinerary, 
since it constitutes the lacking element that causes the collapse of the zoo. Indeed, on the 
one hand, if asceticism is a failure, nobody can reach the status of subjectivity and there 
is no opportunity to establish any human relationship at all. There is no power if there is 
nobody to impose power on – this seems to be the logical conclusion. On the other hand, 
however, Sloterdijk clearly supports any intervention through genetic manipulation, 
which is hypothetically possible and increasingly concrete. In fact, there are some 
subjects who can be the object of a controlling power: children. They represent the object 
of selection, the ones who are manipulated. They are subjects in a passive sense, i.e., they 
are subjected to a power which dominates them.
Even though this second point is in evident contradiction with the first one, it is 
fundamental in order to explain Sloterdijk’s final and real aim: to legitimate the actual and 
concrete possibilities of eugenics and their further developments.
However, this additional element represents another contradictory point in the 
philosopher’s thought. Indeed, Sloterdijk tried to eliminate the biological aspect from 
mankind. With his overturn between nature and technology, he has postulated human 
beings as anthropotechnological products, with no bonds to their natural origin and 
15  Indeed, according to Vanni Rovighi (1947), the relationship is not a being, a real entity, in itself: 
the subjects of the relationship exist truly, while the relationship in itself is just an ideal entity.
16  Relationships can be of any kind: as Nick Bostrom (2014) presents in his book, Superintelligence, 
nowadays we can think of relationships which do not need the human element. For example, social 
networks, like Facebook and Twitter, or financial trading are considered as juridical persons which 
establish relationships among themselves. Now, it is right to define them as juridical persons and 
to highlight how humans do not intervene in order to make them real. However, we do have to 
consider that an original human presence was necessary in order to create the social networks as 
well as the financial system or trade. Therefore, we can actually still argue in favor of the need of 
this initial human presence, at least when we refer to social dynamics as well as powerful ones.
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environment. However, once he argues in favour of genetic manipulation, he necessarily 
refers to the biological element of individuals: there is no possibility of selection if there is 
no biological matter to intervene upon. Therefore, his attempts to redesign and reconfigure 
the whole understanding of humans and their environment appear as a counter-productive 
move in his revolutionary plan. Indeed, in order to support this part of his elitist project, 
he should give back to nature its role as the humans’ mother-nature, that mother who 
generates them as beings. With a body which can be modified and manipulated. However, 
this is an impossible step back that would damage the reconfiguration of the environment 
itself – which constitutes the foundation of the entire techno-polis.
Thus, the postulation of technology – as the key to re-reading the environment and 
ethics, and the resulting technological society redesigned on these bases, hierarchical 
and against human rights – becomes the reason for its own collapse. Technopolitics, 
initially theorized to validate the human zoo and to be its final outcome, turns into its 
own destruction.
A key contribution of the analysis made so far has been to highlight how a 
redefinition of the environment via technology becomes the powerful theoretical tool 
which entirely reconfigures Sloterdijk’s philosophical itinerary. The problematic outcome 
of technopolitics shows the antidemocratic and elitist characteristics which derive from 
a redefinition of nature as a technological environment, which structures a polis based on 
a hierarchy among people. However, it is necessary to recognize the peculiarity of nature 
as an autonomous and independent environment which technology cannot control and 
destroy completely. Only in this way is it possible to give back to nature is crucial role, 
reconsidering technology as an artificial tool produced by humans and not their natural 
environment or their Ark to salvation.
Therefore, by reviewing Sloterdijk’s philosophical speculation and evaluating his 
technological revolution, we can reassign to the environment its natural and original 
significance. Paradoxically, in order to re-establish ethics, democracy and human 
rights, Sloterdijk’s reflections are crucial. Indeed, Sloterdijk’s upside down turns can be 
interpreted as a proof of the crucial significance of these concepts.
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